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Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint
Abstract
Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose suﬃciently severe punishments
in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We characterize the ability of oligopolistic firms to
implement a collusive strategy when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods
is limited by a severity constraint. It captures all situations in which either structural conditions
(the form of payoﬀ functions), institutional circumstances (a regulation), or financial consider-
ations (profitability requirements) set a lower bound to firms’ losses. The model specifications
encompass the structural assumptions (A1-A3) in Abreu (1986) [Journal of Economic Theory,
39, 191-225]. The optimal punishment scheme is characterized, and the expression of the lowest
discount factor for which collusion can be sustained is computed, that both depend on the status
of the severity constraint. This extends received results from the literature to a large class of
models that include a severity constraint, and uncovers the role of structural parameters that
facilitate collusion by relaxing the constraint.
JEL Classification: C72; D43; L13.
Keywords: Collusion ; Oligopoly ; Penal codes.
1 Introduction
We characterize the ability of oligopolistic firms to implement a collusive strategy when their
ability to punish deviations over one or several periods is limited by a severity constraint.
Firms in the same industry may increase profits by coordinating the prices they charge or the
quantities they sell. In a legal context in which collusive agreements cannot be overtly enforced,
and future profits are discounted, it is well known that an impatient firm may find it privately
profitable to deviate for a while from a collusive strategy. This renders collusive agreements
fundamentally unstable. However, firms may design non-cooperative discipline mechanisms that
help implementing collusion.
Many papers investigate the structural conditions that facilitate the formation of cartels.
Most theoretical contributions rely on a class of dynamic models usually referred to as su-
pergames. These models feature a repeated market game in which firms maximize a flow of
discounted individual profits by non-cooperatively choosing a price or a quantity over an in-
finite number of periods. When a deviation can be credibly and suﬃciently “punished” via
lower industry prices or larger quantities in subsequent time periods, conditions on structural
parameters can be derived which, when satisfied, make collusion stable. One stream of that
literature has followed Friedman (1971) by considering trigger strategies (commonly referred
to as “grim” strategies), which call for reversion to the one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium
forever when a deviation is detected in a previous period. A general result is that collusion
can be sustained if the discount factor is above a threshold value. When firms cannot observe
their competitors’ output levels, unobserved random shocks in demand can induce price wars to
appear in equilibrium (see Porter (1983), Green and Porter (1984)). When all parameters and
individual strategies are observable, models with various specific functional forms indicate that
tacitly collusive agreements are more easily sustained with quantity-setting firms than with in
price-setting oligopolists, and with highly diﬀerentiated products, for any number of firms (e.g.,
Deneckere (1983, 1984), Majerus (1988), Chang (1991), Ross (1992), Häckner (1994)).
A weakness common to all models of collusion with trigger strategies is that they rule out
the possibility of modulating the level of punishments. More precisely, by assuming that when
a deviation is detected firms revert to the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot stage game forever,
they put an upper bound on the severity of punishments. When profits cannot be negative in
the punishment phase, they maintain high the payoﬀs to cheating on the collusive agreement.
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Therefore most recent papers investigate the impact of various model specifications on the sus-
tainability of collusion with stick-and-carrot mechanisms in the style of Abreu (1986, 1988). In
this category of mechanisms, if a firm deviates from collusion, all firms play a punishment strat-
egy over one or several periods — the stick — which can be more severe than Nash reversion (i.e.,
it may lead to lower instantaneous profits, possibly negative, which represents a gain in realism)
before returning to a collusive price or quantity. If a deviation occurs in a punishment period,
the punishment phase restarts, otherwise all firms resume the collusive behavior to earn super-
normal profits — the carrot. More specifically, Abreu (1986) exploits a single-period punishment
mechanism for a class of repeated quantity-setting oligopoly stage games with identical sellers
of a homogenous good, constant positive marginal costs, and no fixed cost. For a given discount
factor, the same most severe punishment quantity firms may sell — following a deviation either
from collusion or from the punishment rule, indiﬀerently — so that firms never deviate from
collusion in equilibrium, is characterized. It leads firms to reach the highest level of discounted
collusive profits.
The analysis of the connection between structural conditions and collusion stability, with
a stick-and-carrot mechanism à la Abreu, has been extended to many aspects. They include
the case of multi-market contact (Bernheim and Whinston (1990)). Collusion is facilitated
when the same firms are present on several markets. Capacity constraints have been considered
(in particular Lambson (1987, 1994), Compte, Jenny, Rey (2002)). A general message is that
limited and asymmetric capacities make collusion more diﬃcult to sustain. Other papers focus on
cost heterogeneity (including Rothschild (1999), Vasconcelos (2005)). It is found that collusion
sustainability depends on the diﬀerence between the marginal cost levels that characterize the
less and most eﬃcient firms in the industry. Another research stream focuses on circumstances
in which each firm receives a cost shock in each period (notably Athey et al. (2001, 2004, 2008)).
An important result is that, when marginal costs are private information and may diﬀer across
firms, and under simple and general assumptions, ex ante cartel payoﬀs are maximized when
firms charge the same collusive price and share the market equally, as in simpler models with
complete information and symmetric firms. Other contributions, which do not always allow for
the possibility of pricing below marginal costs, investigate the impact of changes in demand,
with various specifications for the dynamics of shocks (see in particular Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), Bagwell and Staiger (1997)). A “tuned” collusive
price gets closer to the competitive level when demand is high.1
1For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the factors that facilitate collusion, see Motta (2004).
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Our objective is to enrich the study of the circumstances that facilitate collusion, or make it
more diﬃcult to sustain. This is done by investigating the exact role of a key assumption in the
seminal paper by Abreu (1986), according to which the price is strictly positive for all levels of
industry output, so that there is no floor for firms’ losses. Hence the quantity sold — and related
costs — can tend to infinity when firms charge below the marginal cost and the price approaches
zero. In that case the severity of punishments, following a deviation, is unbounded. Interestingly,
to our knowledge most papers — if not all — that refer to Abreu (1986, 1988) relax this assumption
by introducing more structure. They either assume that demand is finite at all prices, or that
firms have limited production capacity, so that firms’ losses are bounded in a punishment period.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) emphasize that when the severity of punishments is limited “it is
not obvious precisely which actions should be specified” (p. 165) in the punishment phase, and
remark that a discrete number of punishment periods does not necessarily exist that exactly
compensates for the limited severity in a single period. We precisely examine this point. This is
done in a setup that encompasses the main assumptions in Abreu (1986). In our model, firms
sell substitutable goods (possibly diﬀerentiated), inverse demand functions are non-increasing
(they can be finite at all prices), the marginal cost is constant and non-negative (it can be zero),
and there can be a fixed cost. In addition to standard incentive and participation constraints, a
key specification we introduce is a severity constraint, which amounts to imposing a limitation
on the lowest level of profits a firm may earn. Whether the severity constraint binds or not
impacts firms’ choices of price or quantity in the punishment phase.
A severity constraint clearly relates to many real-world situations. It captures all contexts
in which either structural conditions (i.e., demand and technological features), institutional
circumstances (e.g., a price-floor regulation), or financial pressure considerations (e.g., a return
on investment target), set a lower bound to firms’ losses.
When demand is finite, or capacity is limited, an example of structural condition that de-
termines the lower bound to firms’ payoﬀs, and thereby impacts their ability to enforce severe
punishment schemes, is the unit cost of production. A firm with high fixed and/or variable costs
will earn more negative payoﬀs during aggressive pricing episodes than more eﬃcient firms. In
theory, a high unit cost will a priori have an ambiguous eﬀect on collusion sustainability, since
it also reduces incentives to deviate. On the empirical side, Symeonidis (2003) finds strong
evidence that collusion is more likely in industries with high capital intensity. This result is
interpreted as a consequence of high barriers to entry.2 Another possible interpretation, we in-
2 In Symeonidis (2003), the capital stock of the average plant, and the capital-labour ratio, are a proxy for high
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vestigate below, is that high unit costs — which permit severe punishments — facilitate collusion.
An example of regulatory measure that reduces the severity of punishments is a price floor. As
it rules out severe punishments, it should hinder collusion. In an empirical paper, Gagné et al.
(2006) study the impact on prices of a price floor established by the Quebec provincial govern-
ment on the retail market for gasoline. By limiting the severity of price wars, the floor was seen
as a mean to reduce the ability of firms to punish retailers deviating from a high price strategy.
The analysis reveals that the net eﬀect of the floor on average price-cost margins is near zero.
The impact of the floor on retail prices in low margin periods (or price wars) is actually oﬀset by
the rise in their average duration. Price wars are less severe, but they last longer.3 Our analysis
oﬀers theoretical grounds to these empirical findings. Financial parameters may also shape the
severity constraint. For example, the managers of equity-dependent firms are not likely to post
low operational profits for too long. The recent empirical literature has evidenced the connection
between stock prices and firms’ investments, as in Baker et al. (2003). Our theoretical analysis
leads us to conjecture there is also a link between financial constraints and the ability to collude.
In this paper, by delineating the largest parameter space for which a collusive strategy can
be implemented, we fully characterize the conditions under which the severity constraint does
reduce firms’ ability to implement a given collusive action (a price or a quantity), when the
duration of punishments can be adjusted. For given cost and demand parameters, the optimal
punishment path is defined as a vector of prices or quantities, played period after period, that
let firms implement a given collusive strategy for the lowest admissible discount factor. When
the limited severity constraint is slack, we find that the possibility to punish over several periods
does not result in a lower threshold for the discount factor than with a single-period punishment
scheme. This holds both with a slack and with a binding participation constraint (although
the threshold diﬀers across the two cases). When the severity constraint binds, the lowest
discount factor for which a given collusive strategy can be implemented strictly decreases if the
punishment phase is not limited to a single period. We also find that the lower bound is always
reached for a finite number of periods. When the participation constraint is not binding, this
barriers to entry, which in turn are seen to facilitate collusion. See also Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
3The introduction of a price floor followed a price war. The local association of independent gasoline retailers
reported that the price war “resulted in retail prices that were observed well below wholesale prices. It was so
severe as to force several independent retailers either to close down temporarily or to exit the market” (translated
from the Mémoire de l’Association Québécoise des Indépendants du Pétrole, June 1998, pp. 7-8). In another
empirical analysis of the impact of this regulation, Houde (2008) finds that the minimum retail price floor had a
significant impact on firms’ option value of staying in the market.
6
bound remains strictly higher than in the absence of severity constraint. Although the duration
is not bounded, the severity constraint still handicaps firms’ ability to collude, implying that
a delayed punishment with discounting oﬀers only an imperfect substitute for more immediate
severity. When the participation constraint binds, the multi-period discount lower bound is as
low as in the single-period case. When the severity constraint binds, we also find that there exists
an infinity of simple punishment paths that permit firms to implement the collusive strategy.
This does not hold when only incentive constraints are at play, in which case there is a unique
optimal punishment path.
These results, which are derived in an abstract theoretical framework, are illustrated in
the context of an example with specific functional forms. It helps assessing the importance of
considering limited severity constraints. In a standard n-firm Cournot oligopoly model, with
linear demand, horizontal product diﬀerentiation, and constant non-negative marginal costs,
we investigate the circumstances in which a multi-period punishment is needed to implement
optimal collusion. With no fixed cost, this is shown to depend on the number of firms, the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and the constant unit (and marginal) cost level. We obtain a
partition of the parameter space into three subsets, which relate to the status of all constraints.
With a linear demand (the quantity demanded is finite at all prices), the most severe punishment
is obtained when the price charged by all firms is equal to zero. That is, the lower bound to
punishment profits results from the non-negativity constraint in prices. Whether the severity of
the endogenous single-period punishment quantity is constrained or not is shown to depend on
the comparison of the marginal cost parameter with a threshold level, which in turn depends
on the number of firms and on the degree of diﬀerentiation. The severity constraint can be
ignored for any level of constant marginal cost and any degree of product diﬀerentiation only if
there are exactly two or three firms. In that case, the results obtained in the related literature
with a duopoly and a constant marginal (and unit) cost normalized to zero are robust to the
introduction of a positive marginal cost. With more than three firms, we find that the marginal
cost and/or the diﬀerentiation parameter must be higher than a threshold, we compute, for the
limited severity constraint not to bind. This was not unveiled by past theoretical studies. Note
though that, in an exploratory note, Lambertini and Sasaki (2001) already claimed that “high
marginal costs tends to provide more room for tacit collusion than [...] with lower marginal
costs, due to the positive price constraint” (p. 119). Moreover, introducing a positive fixed
cost reduces the parameter subset in which the severity constraint binds, therefore a high unit
cost facilitates collusion. This oﬀers a more direct explanation than the one received from the
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literature for the empirical observation that collusion is more likely when capital intensity is
high. Also when the severity constraint binds, we establish that the lowest discount value for
which collusion can be implemented decreases when the number of firms decreases, and either
diﬀerentiation or the marginal cost increases. This extends results received from the literature to
situations in which there is a severity constraint, and also emphasizes that all factors enhancing
firms’ ability to punish — in that they relax the severity constraint — facilitate collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section
3, we restrict the duration of a punishment phase to a single period, and identify the largest
space of parameters for which a collusive strategy can be implemented. In Section 4, we obtain
the main results by investigating the impact of the ability to choose a punishment action over
several periods on firms’ ability to collude. In section 5, the latter results are illustrated in the
context of a linear Cournot model. In Section 6 we discuss our results in the light of the related
literature.
2 The Model
We construct a supergame, in which identical firms in N = {1, . . . , n} supply substitutable
goods, possibly diﬀerentiated, to maximize individual intertemporal profits by simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choosing a strategy ai — or “action” — that is either a price or a quantity, in
an infinitely repeated stage game over t = 1, 2, ...,∞. Each firm’s action set A ⊂ R+ is compact.
The discount factor δ = 1/(1 + r), where r is the single period interest rate, is common to all
firms. The continuous function πi : R2+ → R+ relates firm i’s profits to a vector of actions
a ≡ (ai, a−i), where a−i describes a symmetric action chosen by all firms in N\{i}. We omit the
subscript i and specify a single argument a, that is a scalar, to represent the profits π(a) earned
by firms that all choose the same action. Similarly, we denote by πdi (a) the profits firm i earns
when it “deviates”, in that it plays its best reply to a, as played by all other firms. The set of
available actions includes a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy aNE, implicitly
defined by πdi (aNE) − π(aNE) = 0, all i, and a collusive action, am, which yields more profits
(ideally am maximizes joint profits, a case of perfect collusion, as in the example we present in
Section 5). Firms’ actions may diﬀer from period to period. An action path {at}∞t=1 is defined as
an infinite sequence of n-dimensional vectors of actions, as chosen by each firm in each period.
We give more structure to the analysis by relating each firm i’s profits πi = piqi − C (qi),
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where pi is a price qi a quantity, to the exact properties of cost and demand conditions. There
are three basic assumptions:
(A1) Firms incur a fixed cost f ≥ 0, and a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0, to sell substitutable
goods (possibly diﬀerentiated), and their strategic variable is either price (a = p in the
Bertrand specification) or quantity (a = q in the Cournot specification).
(A2) Firm i’s inverse demand function pi : Rn+ → R+ is non-increasing and continuous.
(A3) pi (0) > c and limqi→∞ pi (qi,q−i) = 0, any q−i.
The main features of our model appear clearly when compared with the specifications in
Abreu (1986), a reference, where the following three assumptions hold: ( eA1) Firms sell a ho-
mogeneous good at constant marginal cost c > 0, and their strategic variable is quantity; ( eA2)
The market inverse demand function p : R+ → R+ is strictly decreasing and continuous; ( eA3)
p (0) > c and limq→∞ p (q) = 0, with q =
P
i∈N qi. Note that the latter two assumptions imply
that, for all levels of total output q, the price p is strictly positive. They also imply that there
exists qc > 0 such that p (qc) < c. This says that firms can always force the price p at which firm
i sells qi down to a level strictly below c. In this case there is no floor for firms’ losses since the
quantity sold — and related costs — can tend to infinity when p approaches 0. The latter three
assumptions are encompassed by (A1-A3). Note our assumptions also capture circumstances in
which the price pi is driven down to exactly zero with finite quantities (qi,q−i), a case that is
ruled out by ( eA1- eA3).
As in Abreu (1986) we construct a “stick-and-carrot” penal code. All firms initially collude
by choosing the collusive action am. If this action is played by all firms in all periods, each firm
earns a discounted sum of symmetric single-period collusive profits πm ≡ π (am). All firms have
a short-run incentive to deviate, that is to lower (increase) its own price (quantity) in order to
increase individual profits at every other firm’s expense. If such a deviation by one firm i in N
is detected in period t, all firms switch to the punishment action aP in period t+ 1 (the stick).
After one period of punishment, if any deviation from aP is detected, the punishment phase
restarts, otherwise all firms resume the collusive behavior by adopting the same am forever (the
carrot). The need for a punishment is rooted in the fact that each individual firm, assuming
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that all other firms play the collusive action, has a short-run incentive to lower (increase) its own
price (quantity) to increase individual profits at every other firm’s expense. Then the choice of
a low (high) punishment price (quantity) aP in the next period renders a free-riding behavior
less attractive.
In order to express results and related proofs with notational parsimony, indiﬀerently in the
price and quantity specifications, hereafter we adopt the definition that action a0 is (strictly)
more severe than a when π(a0) < (=)π(a). This is denoted by a0 ≺ (=)a. A key feature of the
paper is that we investigate the consequence of having a lower bound to individual punishment
actions, and thereby to punishment profits. We refer to aP ≺ aNE as the most severe symmetric
punishment action, a parameter. Note that aP exists from the compactness of A. Then the
continuity of πi implies that π ≡ π (aP ) < π (aNE) is well defined. Most realistic circumstances
oﬀer a justification for this setting. It can capture the impact of a regulatory measure. For
example, a price floor will impose firms to charge above a given value (say, a wholesale price),
and then will limit the severity of punishment actions (in some cases we may have π > 0). More
generally, the severity of punishments is also limited when the demanded quantity is finite at any
price, including zero, for all firms. As indicated above, there is no such limit on punishments in
Abreu (1986).4 However, we may point to such a floor in more applied and recent contributions
to the literature. When the marginal cost is constant and set equal to zero, as in Häckner (1996)
or Compte et al. (2002), for examples, the lowest possible profits are zero. Another example is
Vasconcelos (2005), where there is a variable marginal cost and a finite demand, so that profits
can be negative but limitedly so. Our more general specification also captures these cases.
We now introduce a few additional assumptions that are needed to produce formal results.
The first one extends the order relationship, as follows:
(A4) If a−i Â (=)a0−i then πi(a) > (=)πi(ai,a0−i), all a0−i, a−i ¹ am.
This says that, in the Bertrand (resp. Cournot) specification, firm i’s profits are non-
decreasing (resp. non-increasing) with other firms’ symmetric price (resp. quantity).
4 In Abreu (1986), the action set is also compact (see Assumption (A4), p. 195). The lower bound M¯(δ), in
the reference paper, by definition is more severe that the optimal punishment action. To compare, in the present
model, the most severe punishment π can be arbitrarily close to the Nash payoﬀ π (aNE).
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Another specification of the model relates to deviation profits. A firm can earn positive
benefits by playing its best reply to all other firms’ action, only if the latter action is not too
severe. Formally:
(A5) There exists a˜P ¹ aNE such that πdi (a) < (=)0 if and only if a ≺ (=)a˜P .
When all firms in N\{i} play a Â a˜P , the latter assumption implies that firm i’s gross
deviation profits are strictly higher than the level of fixed costs, that is f . A consequence of
(A5) is that π (aNE) ≥ 0.
Although the analysis focuses on situations with limited punishments, the latter may be
very severe. A reference action that measures this severity is aˆP , which is such that the minmax
profit is obtained by stopping production. We assume that:
(A6) There exists aˆP ¹ a˜P such that πdi (a) = (>)− f if and only if a ¹ (Â)aˆP .
In terms of output quantity, let qdi (a) denote firm i’s best-reply to a, as chosen by all other
firms. Assumption (A6) specifies that qdi (a) = 0 if a ¹ aˆP , and qdi (a) > 0 otherwise. In words,
any action a, as chosen by all firms in N\{i}, that is strictly more severe than aˆP , drives firm i’s
profit-maximizing output (and gross profits) to zero. In particular, if aˆP º aP , then the most
severe symmetric punishment action, when played by all firms in N\{i}, is suﬃciently penalizing
as to incentivize firm i to stop producing, and thereby to incur losses equal to the magnitude of
fixed costs, its minmax value. Note that π(a) > π if aˆP º a Â aP , although qdi (a) = qdi (aP ) = 0,
with firm i’s best-reply profits πdi (a) = π
d
i (aP ) = −f ≤ 0. To gain familiarity with the notation,
observe that when firms’ strategic variable is price, and c = f = π = 0, as commonly assumed
for simplicity in many models, we have a˜P = aP = aˆP = 0, a particular case.
When no constraint on the severity of a is introduced, as in most contributions to the
literature, profits π (a) are unbounded from below. In that case, since best-reply profits πdi (a) do
have a lower bound (a firm may always stop selling; see (A6)), we have πdi (a)−π (a) unbounded
from above. Recalling that πdi (aNE)− π (aNE) = 0, we know there exists at least one aˇ ¹ aNE
verifying πdi (aˇ) − π (aˇ) = πdi (am) − πm > 0. The final assumption we introduce specifies
uniqueness, for simplicity:
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(A7) There exists a unique aˇ ≺ am such that πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ) = πdi (am)− πm.
Clearly aˇ ≺ aNE. Remark that (A7) is very mild. It captures in particular all usual situations
in which the incentive to deviate πdi (a) − π(a) increases with the severity of actions a ¹ aNE ,
and also with the level of collusion a Â aNE.5
In what follows we investigate the role of the parameter π, that is the finite lower bound
to individual punishment profits, on the implementation of collusion. This is done by first
considering situations in which the duration of punishments is limited to a single period.
3 Single-Period Punishments
In this section we restrict the duration of the punishment phase to a single period. For each
player to have no incentive to deviate, a deviation must be followed by a punishment that leads
the discounted flow of profits to be less than the actualized stream of collusive equilibrium profits.
Moreover, for the punishment to be a credible threat, one should verify that firms do implement
the punishment action. This occurs if individual gains to deviate from the punishment phase
are smaller than the loss incurred by prolonging the punishment by one more period.6
Formally, the profile {am, aP}, with aP ¹ am, must satisfy two incentive constraints, we
refer to hereafter as IC1 and IC2, that is
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC1)
πdi (aP )− π(aP ) ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC2)
where π(a) denotes each firm’s stage profit when all firms choose the same action a, and πdi (a)
is firm i’s profit from a one-shot best deviation from the action a selected by all firms in N\{i},
with a = am, aP . The first condition says that the profits associated with a deviation from the
5For an illustration with quantity-setting firms see Fig. 2 in Abreu (1986). In the present paper Fig. 1 is made
very intuitive when a is interpreted as a price.
6 In a trigger penal code à la Friedman (1971), a deviation implies that firms stop colluding and revert to the
one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever. The punishment action is then self-enforcing. A stick-and-carrot
setup authorizes a more severe (and also shorter) punishment phase that may lead firms to earn negative profits
for some time. It is not self-enforcing, hence (IC2) is needed.
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collusive action must be smaller than what is lost due to the punishment phase. The second
condition says that the benefits associated with a deviation from the punishment must be smaller
than the loss incurred by prolonging the punishment by one more period.
Our objective is to delineate the largest space of parameters for which the two constraints
are satisfied. The problem we investigate is thus to find a punishment aP that minimizes δ under
the two incentive constraints (IC1-IC2). The solution a∗P , defined as the optimal punishment,
yields δ∗, the minimum. Before introducing additional constraints, we characterize a∗P and δ
∗
by presenting three intermediate results.
Lemma 1. The optimal single-period punishment action a∗P and the discount factor lower bound
δ∗ are such that (IC1) and (IC2) hold with equality.
Proof. See the appendix.
This first result establishes that, when aP = a∗P , and δ = δ
∗, the two incentive constraints
are exactly satisfied. Therefore we may compute a∗P and δ
∗ by solving in (aP , δ) the system
(IC1-IC2) with equality signs.
To compare, recall that Abreu (1986)’s problem consists in identifying the pair of actions
(aP , aC) that permits firms to maintain the most profitable collusive action aC for a given
discount factor δ. The two approaches are dual since the value δ∗ we obtain as a solution, for
a given am, is identical to the given value of δ that leads to the solution a∗C = am in Abreu’s
problem. In the latter, the solution a∗C is bounded from above by the stage-game joint-profit
maximizing action. When δ is high enough for this boundary value to be implemented as
a collusive equilibrium, the constraint not to deviate from collusion is slack. This says why
Lemma 1 diﬀers slightly from Abreu’s Theorem 15, in which the analogue of (IC1) holds with a
weak inequality only (while the analogue to (IC2) holds with an equality sign, as in the present
case).
Note however that the single-period punishment action that implements the collusive action,
for all admissible parameter values, needs not be a∗P . This is because a
∗
P is defined as the
punishment action that satisfies (IC1-IC2) for the lowest possible value of δ, that is exactly δ∗.
When δ > δ∗, the collusive action is implementable with a “non-optimal punishment” aP about
a∗P .
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Lemma 2. Given am, the optimal punishment action a∗P is such that π
d
i (a
∗
P )−π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)−
πm.
Proof. The constraints in (IC1-IC2) can be rewritten as δ ≥ δ0 and δ ≥ δ00, respectively,
with δ0 ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/ [πm − π(aP )] and δ00 ≡
£
πdi (aP )− π(aP )
¤
/ [πm − π(aP )]. Lemma 1
implies that
δ∗ = δ0
¯¯
aP=a∗P
= δ00
¯¯
aP=a∗P
.
It is then suﬃcient to observe that the numerators of δ0 and δ00 are identically equal to conclude
that the numerators πdi (am)− πm and πdi (aP )− π(aP ) are also equal if aP = a∗P .
Lemma 2 oﬀers an implicit definition of a∗P and says that, in the stage game, a firm’s
incentive to deviate from a∗P is equal to the incentive to deviate from am (see Fig. 1). Note that
the incentive to deviate from am is an upper bound to a firm’s incentive to deviate from any a
that verifies a∗P ¹ a ¹ am.
a
Pa
(.)(.), diππ
a~
ma
*
Pa
)( *Paπ
)( mm aππ ≡
(.)diπ
(.)π
)( m
d
i aπ
)( *P
d
i aπ
)( Paππ ≡
NEa
Figure 1: The optimal punishment action a∗P is such that πdi (a∗P )− π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)− πm, given am (here with
aP ≺ a˜ ≺ a∗P ≺ aP ).
The next technical result establishes a monotonicity property.
Lemma 3. πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a0), all a º a0.
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Proof. Recall that πdi (a−i) ≡ πi
¡
adi (a−i) , a−i
¢
, with adi (a−i) ≡ argmaxai πi (ai, a−i). From
the definition of adi (a−i), we have
πi
³
adi (a−i) , a−i
´
≥ πi
³
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a−i
´
,
all a−i, a0−i. Next, from the monotonicity of πi
¡
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a−i
¢
in a−i, we know that a−i º a0−i
implies
πi
³
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a−i
´
≥ πi
³
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a0−i
´
.
This leads to πdi (a−i) ≥ πdi
¡
a0−i
¢
by transitivity.
We now introduce two additional constraints. The first one is a participation constraint.7 It
specifies that each firm, when it actualizes the future stream of profits earned from the period
of punishment onward, must be incentivized to continue playing the game even if it earned
negative profits for a while. Formally, it must be the case that π(aP ) +
P∞
k=1 δ
kπm ≥ 0. A
simple reorganization of terms, toward a more intuitive expression, leads to
(1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm. (PC )
In words, the participation constraint is satisfied when the profit a firm forgoes in the
punishment period, that is the diﬀerence πm−π(aP ), is not greater than the discounted stream
of collusive profits earned in all following periods, that is πm/ (1− δ).8 Note that (IC2), we may
rewrite as (1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm−πdi (aP ), can be easily compared to (PC ). Recalling from
(A5) that πdi (aP ) > (=)0 if and only if aP Â (=)a˜P , observe that (IC2) is (weakly) stronger
than (PC ) if and only if aP Â (=)a˜P . It follows that, when a∗P ≺ a˜P , (PC ) is violated, hence
δ∗ is not attainable. In this case, toward a solution to the participation-constrained problem
we define a particular punishment action, denoted by aP , that satisfies exactly both (IC1) and
(PC ). In formal terms, π (aP ) = πm − πdi (am).9 For notational clarity, let π ≡ π (aP ).
7 In a price-setting oligopoly with a homogenous good, a constant average cost, and capacity constraints,
Lambson (1987) introduces it as an individual rationality constraint.
8When compared with a trigger penal code (where a deviation implies that firms stop colluding and revert to
the one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever, à la Friedman (1971)), a stick-and-carrot setup authorizes a
shorter and more severe punishment phase that may lead firms to earn negative profits for some time without
violating the individual rationality constraint (PC ). This results in a more eﬃcient punishment in the sense that
collusion can be sustained for lower values of the discount factor.
9The implicit definition of aP obtains by rewriting (IC1) as δ ≥
?
πdi (am)− πm
?
/ [πm − π (aP )], and (PC)
as δ ≥ −π (aP ) / [πm − π (aP )]. Then observe that the denominators are equal. Note that aP ≺ aNE since
π (aP ) < 0.
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A useful technical result is:
Lemma 4. aP º a∗P if and only if a˜P º a∗P .
Proof. Suﬃciency: If a˜P º a∗P then πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 by (A5) . Suppose aP ≺ a∗P and look
for a contradiction. By Lemma 3, aP ≺ a∗P implies πdi (aP ) ≤ πdi (a∗P ) hence πdi (aP ) ≤ 0. It
also implies by Lemma 2 and (A7) that πdi (aP ) − π > πdi (am) − πm. It follows that π <
πm − πdi (am) + πdi (aP ) ≤ πm − πdi (am) , which clearly contradicts the definition of aP . As a
result a˜P º a∗P implies aP º a∗P .
Necessity: If a˜P ≺ a∗P , suppose that aP º a∗P and look for a contradiction. Clearly π < 0
implies aP ≺ am. By Lemma 2 and (A7), a∗P ¹ aP ≺ am implies that πdi (aP )−π ≤ πdi (am)−πm.
From the very definition of aP , it follows that πdi (aP ) ≤ 0 = πdi (a˜P ). By Lemma 3, this implies
that aP ¹ a˜P and by transitivity through a˜P ≺ a∗P , that aP ≺ a∗P , a contradiction. As a result
aP º a∗P implies a˜P º a∗P .
The next constraint is central to the analysis. It imposes a limit to the severity of the
symmetric punishments all firms may inflict on each other in a single period. When punishment
profits may not be infinite, aP must satisfy
π(aP ) ≥ π. (SC )
This can be rooted in structural conditions (i.e., the demanded quantity can be specified to be
finite at any price, including zero), or in institutional features (e.g., a regulation). In what follows
we refer to this weak inequality as the severity constraint. It does not appear in Abreu (1986)’s
seminal paper, where the inverse demand is strictly monotonic, so that below-cost pricing may
result in infinite losses to all firms. The order relation on the set of punishment actions aP , as
defined in the previous section, implies that (SC ) can be rewritten equivalently as aP º aP .
This does not mean that the optimal a∗P , when it satisfies (SC ), cannot not be associated with
very low profits in the period of punishment. Recall from (A5) that the “lower” bound aP , when
played by all firms in N\{i}, can be suﬃciently severe as to incentivize firm i to stop producing
as a best-reply.
We may now write the δ-minimization problem in aP as follows:
min
aP
δ
s.t. IC1; IC2;PC ;SC
(1)
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We now determine the lowest δ for which the collusive action am is implementable. This
relies on the comparison of the structurally defined punishment actions a∗P , aP , and aP .
Proposition 1. The collusive action am is implementable with a single-period punishment if
and only if δ ≥ δ∗1, with
δ∗1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
δ∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π(a∗P )
if a∗P º aP , aP (regime 1);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º aP , a∗P (regime 2);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º a∗P , aP (regime 3).
(2)
Proof. First we solve a less constrained version of (1), in which (PC ) and (SC ) are absent.
Then we reintroduce each of the latter two constraints separately. (See the appendix).
δ
ππ −≡ mY
)(δX
)( *Pm aππ −
δ
ππ −m
δ*δ
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Figure 2: The two ICs in (IC1-IC2) rewrite X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ), with X (δ) ≡
?
πdi (am)− πm
?
/δ
and Y (δ, aP ) ≡
?
πm − πdi (aP )
?
/ (1− δ). When PC and SC are absent, the optimal punishment a∗P and the
threshold δ∗ are such that X (δ∗, a∗P ) = Y (δ
∗). Here a∗P ≺ aP ≺ aP , therefore SC binds. The severity-constrained
optimal punishment is aP , and firms may implement am for all δ ≥ δ.
The three regimes identified in Proposition 1 reflect which constraint is at play in the δ-
minimization problem (1). In regime 1, the two incentive constraints are stronger than (PC )
and (SC ). The optimal punishment is a∗P , and the minimized discount factor is δ
∗
1 = δ
∗ (here the
subscript “1” refers to the single-period punishment case). In regime 2, (IC1) and (PC ) bite,
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the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ; while in regime
3, (IC1) and (SC ) are binding, the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only
if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ. Note that (IC1) is active in all regimes. In fact a firm’s incentive to deviate from
the collusive action, as compared to what is lost in the punishment phase, remains the same
in the three regimes. What changes across regimes is the loss firms incur in the punishment
phase, hence the incentive to deviate (see (IC2)) or to participate (see (PC )), together with the
range of possible punishments (see (SC )). An important point is that the comparison between
regime 1 and 2 diﬀers in kind from the comparison between regime 3 and either regime 1 or
2. More precisely, whether a solution is in regime 1 or 2 depends on whether (PC ) in stronger
than (IC2) or not. This is a consequence rooted in the firms’ payoﬀ functions. Whether regime
3 arises or not can depend also on the strategy set, which may be limited “from below” for all
sorts of institutional or financial reasons that do not relate to cost or demand conditions.
Remark 1. If a∗P º aP , aP , so that regime 1 applies, δ∗ ≥ δ, δ.
This remark emphasizes a subtle aspect of Proposition 1. Obviously, when either regime
2 or 3 applies, so that either (PC ) or (SC ) binds, respectively, we have δ∗ ≤ δ, δ. Indeed the
δ-minimization problem (1) is more constrained than when only the incentive constraints (IC1)
and (IC2) are considered. However, when regime 1 applies, (IC1) and (IC2) are stronger than
both (PC ) and (SC ). Hence the relevant threshold δ∗ cannot be lower than δ and δ. In fact,
in the single-period punishment problem, at most two constraints may bind, that determine the
threshold for δ.
Recalling that our objective is to identify the largest space of parameters for which a given
collusive action is implementable, it remains to investigate the possibility to lengthen the dura-
tion of the punishment phase. The intuition is that, by shifting to a multi-period punishment
scheme, firms may penalize more severely a deviation than in the single-period framework. This
may soften the lower bound condition on the discount factor, and thus facilitate collusion.10 We
tackle this next.
10Several periods of punishment have been considered only in a few theoretical contributions with more specific
assumptions than in the present model. Lambson (1987) considers price-setting sellers of a homogenous good,
a constant average cost, with capacity constraints. Häckner (1996) constructs a repeated price-setting duopoly
model, with spatial diﬀerentiation, and a constant average cost normalized to zero. In Lambertini and Sasaki
(2002), again there are two firms and a constant marginal average cost, but with another specification of the
horizontal diﬀerentiation assumption, together with a non-negative constraint on quantities, but not on prices.
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4 Multi-Period Punishments
In this section we introduce the possibility for firms to choose a punishment action over several
periods. The objective is to investigate the impact of the extended length of punishment on
firms’ ability to implement collusion, when the severity of punishment is limited in each period.
To do that, consider a stick-and-carrot penal code in which, if any deviation from am by
any firm is detected, all firms switch to a l-period punishment phase (the stick) during which
they play aP,k, with k = 1, . . . , l. Punishment actions may vary from one period to another. A
deviation from the punishment action may occur in any period of punishment. If this occurs, the
punishment phase restarts for l more periods, after which all firms revert to the initial collusive
action am forever (the carrot).
Formally, the two incentive constraints (IC1) and (IC2) are now extended to
πdi (am) +
lX
k=1
δkπ(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δkπm ≤
∞X
k=0
δkπm, (3)
and
s−1X
k=1
δkπ (aP,k) + δsπdi (aP,s) +
s+lX
k=s+1
δkπ (aP,k−s) +
∞X
k=s+l+1
δkπm (4)
≤
lX
k=1
δkπ(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δkπm,
respectively, for any period s in which a firm deviates from the penal code, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l (we
adopt the convention that
Ps−1
k=1 δ
kπ (aP,k) = 0 if s = 1), all i.
Given am, the vector aP ≡ (aP,1, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l) is an equilibrium of the supergame if and
only if (3) and (4) are satisfied. There are 1+ l incentive constraints in all: the single constraint
in (3) says that the gain earned by deviating from the collusive action must be smaller than
what is lost over the l periods of punishment; the other l constraints in (4) say that the gain to
deviate from the punishment phase, in any period s, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l, must be smaller than the
loss incurred by reinitiating the punishment phase.
To simplify the presentation of incentive constraints and clarify their interpretation, we now
introduce a value function. If a firm does not deviate from the punishment path, the continuation
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profits it earns from period s+ 1 onward is
Vs (aP , δ) =
lX
k=s+1
δk−s−1π(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δk−s−1πm. (5)
Here s = 0 indicates that the l-period flow of punishment profits is not truncated from below,
whereas s = l means that exactly all punishment profits are removed, so that only collusive
profits are considered from period l + 1 onward. Note from (5) that aP,l+1 = am implies
Vs (aP , δ) ≤ Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ), all s. This also implies that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ).
Then the multi-period incentive constraints in (3) and (4) are
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 1)
and
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ δ [V1 (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 2)
. . .
πdi (aP,s)− π(aP,s) ≤ δ [Vs (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (. . .)
. . .
πdi (aP,l)− π(aP,l) ≤ δ [Vl (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC l + 1)
respectively, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Note that π(aP,s) ≤ πdi (aP,s) requires that V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Vs (aP , δ),
all s, a feasibility condition of the punishment scheme.
In (MIC 1), that is the first multi-period punishment incentive constraint, we compare a
firm’s payoﬀs when it colludes by choosing am, that is πm+δV0 (am, δ), with the payoﬀs it earns
by deviating, that is πdi (am) + δV0 (aP , δ). It is individually rational to stick to the collusive
action if this first constraint is satisfied. The next incentive constraints, one for each period of
punishment, compare a firm’s payoﬀ when it implements a punishment action, with the payoﬀs
it earns by deviating. Most precisely, in (MIC 2), the second multi-period punishment incentive
constraint compares the firm’s payoﬀ when it plays aP,1, that is π (aP,1) + δV1 (aP , δ), with the
payoﬀs it earns by deviating, that is πdi (aP,1) + δV0 (aP , δ). The next row describes the same
comparison for the next period of punishment, and so on, down to (MIC l+1). A firm will not
deviate from the l-period punishment path if all constraints of rank s = 1, . . . , l are satisfied.
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A first technical claim is a multi-period counterpart to Lemma 1, as oﬀered above in the
single-period punishment case.
Lemma 5. Given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ verifying (MIC 1-MIC 2) results from pun-
ishment actions aP,k, with k > 1, such that the two multi-period incentive constraints bind.
Proof. See the appendix.
The multi-period participation constraint is V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0. In words, the continuation
profits, from the first period of punishment onward, must remain non-negative for a firm to
implement the punishment aP . Interestingly this can also be rewritten as
(1− δ) [V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] ≤ πm, (MPC )
an intuitive generalization of the single-punishment period counterpart in (PC ). This says that
the sum of profits each firm foregoes by implementing the l-period punishment aP , that is the
diﬀerence V0 (am, δ) − V0 (aP , δ), cannot be more than the discounted stream of profits earned
in all collusive periods that follow, πm/ (1− δ).11
Observe from (MIC 1 and (MPC ) that the value diﬀerential V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ) is bounded
from below by
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and from above by πm/ (1− δ), respectively. This yields:
Lemma 6. (MIC 1) and (MPC ) are compatible only if
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ ≤ πm/ (1− δ), that
is δ ≥
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/πdi (am) = δ.
Proof. The threshold δ =
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/πdi (am) follows directly from the comparison of the
left-hand side and right-hand side of (MIC 1 and (MPC ), respectively. This threshold does not
diﬀer from δ, as introduced in Proposition 1, since the denominator πdi (am) = πm − π from the
implicit definition of aP .
Therefore there can be no l-period punishment aP that implements am when the discount
factor is strictly lower than δ. This means that the lengthening of the punishment scheme cannot
help relaxing the participation constraint.
11The latter interpretation of (MPC ) is even more intuitive when one sees that V0 (aM , δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =?l
k=1 δ
k−1 (π(aM )− π(aP,k)), so that l = 1 leads to (PC ), the participation constraint in the single-period
punishment setup.
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Now the multi-period severity constraint is
π(aP,k) ≥ π, (MSC )
with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, all l ≥ 2. In words, (MSC ) captures structural conditions imposing that, in any
period k of the punishment phase, a firm’s profit cannot be driven below π, a parameter.
The multi-period punishment problem is then
min
(aP,1,...,aP,l)
δ
s.t. (MIC 1−MIC l+1);MPC ;MSC
(7)
For any given l, the optimal multi-period punishment is the solution in aP = (aP,1, . . . , aP,l) to
(7). It yields the lowest possible value of the discount factor, we denote by δ∗l , that authorizes
firms to implement am, under all constraints. In what follows we examine successively the role
of the 1 + l multi-period incentive constraints (MIC 1-MIC l+1), the participation constraint
(MPC ), and the severity constraint (MSC ).
We now establish that, in the absence of participation and severity constraints, the possibility
to punish over several periods does not result in an optimal punishment path that diﬀers from
the single-period punishment case.
Proposition 2. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if a∗P º aP , aP the collusive action am
is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ∗, and a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps (see the appendix):
(i) We investigate a less constrained version of (7) by leaving aside the last l − 1 multi-period
incentive constraints, together with (MPC ) and (MSC ), to keep only (MIC 1) and (MIC 2).
This is done by capitalizing on Lemma 5: we solve in (δ, V1) the system (MIC 1-MIC 2) with
equality signs, to obtain (δ∗(aP,1), V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))); then we identify the level of aP,1 that
minimizes δ∗(aP,1) under the feasibility constraint that V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)) ≤ Vl (aP , δ∗(aP,1)) =
πm/ (1− δ∗(aP,1)). This leads to the minimizer a∗P,1 = a∗P , and to the discount factor δ∗(a∗P,1) =
δ∗.
(ii) We show that (δ∗, V1(aP , δ∗(a∗P ))) satisfies all incentive constraints in (MIC 1-MIC l+1) as
well as (MPC -MSC ).
22
When (MPC ) and (MSC ) are slack, by playing in the first period the action obtained in
the previous section as a (unique) solution to the δ-minimization problem with a single-period
punishment scheme (i.e., a∗P,1 = a
∗
P ), followed in all l−1 subsequent periods by the same collusive
action (i.e., a∗P,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l), one obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which the
collusive action am is implementable. The threshold value of the discount factor we obtain in
this l-period punishment scheme is the same as in the single-punishment case, namely δ∗.
Remark 2. If a∗P º aP , aP there is a unique punishment path a∗P that permits firms to imple-
ment am for δ = δ∗.
In other words, as long as the participation and severity constraints are not binding, there is
one best way to solve (7). In a supergame with discounting, late punishments have less impact.
Firms must charge a low price or supply a large quantity as early as possible, that is in the first
punishment period, in order to mimimize the discount factor at which am is implementable.
Next, we establish that, when the multi-period participation constraint binds, again the
possibility to punish over several periods does not enlarge the space of parameters for which the
collusive action is implementable.
Proposition 3. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º aP , a∗P , the collusive action
am is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ, and aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps (see the appendix):
(i) In addition to (MIC 1) and (MIC 2), we introduce (MPC ) in the less constrained version of
(7) where the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints and (MSC ) are left aside. We show
that (MPC ) is stronger than (IC2) if a∗P ¹ a˜P . Then am is implementable with the l-period
punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) if δ = δ, that is the lower bound to the interval of δ for which
(MIC 1) and (MPC ) are compatible.
(ii) We obtain that (δ,aP ) satisfies all other incentive constraints (MIC 3-MIC l+1), in which
case δ is a solution to (7) and aP is optimal.
When (MPC ) binds, by playing aP in the first punishment period (as in the single-period
scheme), followed by the same collusive action (i.e., aP,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l) in all l − 1
subsequent periods, one obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which the collusive action am
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is implementable, namely δ, the same as in the single-punishment case when (PC ) binds. The
intuition for this result is straightforward. Indeed the participation constraint determines the
maximum total punishment a firm can incur (as opposed to a per-period punishment). In fact
the constraint is the same in the single- and multi-period schemes, since the definition of the
maximum total punishment does not depend on the number of periods. When the participation
constraint binds with only one punishment period, it cannot be relaxed by extending the number
of periods.
Remark 3. If aP Â a∗P there is an infinite number of punishments that permit firms to imple-
ment am for δ = δ.
Proof. See the appendix.
This says that, when (MPC ) binds, the punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is only one way,
among others, of implementing am when the discount factor is the lowest possible, at δ. Firms
may opt for a softer first-period action if they choose to lengthen the punishment phase to one or
several subsequent periods, before reverting to am. While the possibility to punish over several
periods does not permit firms to reduce the discount factor threshold for which the collusive
action is implementable, the space of policies that allow them do so is strictly larger than in the
single-period punishment case.
We now turn to the case of a binding severity constraint. We shall see that it diﬀers quali-
tatively from the previous cases, in that additional punishment periods result in a strictly lower
discount threshold than with a single-period scheme. To show this, we first need the following
two technical results:
Lemma 7. The lowest δ compatible with (MIC 1-MIC 2) and (MSC ) is δ0 ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
.
If aP º a∗P , aP , for collusion to be implemented at δ = δ0, it must be the case that the two
constraints (MIC 1 and (MIC 2) are binding and that aP,1 = aP .
Proof. As for the proof of Proposition 2 consider the δ-minimization problem with the con-
straints (MIC 1) and (MIC 2) only. Recall that (15) must hold with an equality sign throughout
for δ to be minimized (Lemma 5), and the solution in (δ, V1) is (δ∗(aP,1),V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))), with
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
.
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The monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (Lemma 3) implies that δ
∗(aP,1) is monotone non-
decreasing in aP,1. Then substitute aP for aP,1 to find δ
∗(aP ) = δ
0.
Lemma 8. For all V verifying π < (1− δ)V ≤ πm, there exists a finite l and a punishment
aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l), with aP,k º aP for all k > 1, such that V1 (aP , δ) = V .
Proof. There are three steps (we develop in the appendix): (1) we show that, given any δ, for
any l ≥ 2 there exists a punishment alP of length l such that V1 (aP , δ) = V for any V in a closed
interval Il we define; (2) we establish that the upper-bound of Il+1 is the lower bound of Il so
that their finite union IL = ∪Ll=1Il is itself a closed interval; (3) we conclude by evidencing that
the lower and upper bounds of the union are respectively π/ (1− δ) and πm/ (1− δ).
The next proposition describes the optimal punishment, and characterizes the associated
discount threshold, when (MSC ) binds.
Proposition 4. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º a∗P , aP , there exists a finite
l > 1 such that the collusive action am is implementable if and only if δ ≥ sup{δ0, δ} ≡ δM .
Proof. There are two cases (we develop in the appendix) that depend on the comparison of
δ0 and δ. In both cases: (1) we establish that there exists a finite punishment, we denote
aP , which is such that V1 (aP , δ) is equal to a particular value we explicit; (2) we check that
all incentive constraints are satisfied; (3) we also verify that the participation and severity
constraints hold.
Remark 4. If (MSC ) is strictly binding, that is if aP Â a∗P , aP , there exits a continuum of finite
optimal punishments (aP , a2, . . . , al), with l ≥ 2, such that am is implementable for δ = δM .
Proof. Consider the punishment profile of Lemma 8, that is alP ≡ (alP,1, alP,2, . . . , alP,k, . . . , alP,l),
where alP,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and alP,l º aP . We know from Proposition 4 that
there exists a punishment profile of this kind that allows firms to implement am for δ = δM .We
also have shown that, for this punishment profile, the (MIC l + 1) constraint holds and is slack.
One may construct a l+ 1 period punishment profile identical to alP up to the period k = l− 1
and with a0P,l Â alP,l and a0P,l+1 ≺ am such that
π (aP,l) + δπm = π
¡
a0P,l
¢
+ δπ
¡
a0P,l+1
¢
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and all incentive constraints are satisfied.
In the next final proposition, that synthesizes the previous results, we may now rank all the
discount thresholds introduced above.
Proposition 5.
If aP Â a∗P , aP then either aP ¹ a∗P so that δ∗ < δM < δ, or aP Â a∗P in which case
δ ≤ δM < δ. We have δM = δ if and only if a˜P º aP Â aP Â a∗P .
Proof. We assume that aP Â a∗P , aP . To see that δM < δ, recall that δM ≡ sup{δ0, δ}
and consider the two possible cases: (i) If δM = δ then it suﬃces to recall that aP Â a∗P , aP
implies δ > δ (see Remark 1) to conclude. (ii) If δM = δ
0 then compare the expressions of the
denominators of δ0 and δ. We have πdi (am) − πdi (aP ) > πm − π if and only if πdi (am) − πm >
πdi (aP ) − π. Then it suﬃces to see that the latter inequality is implied by δ∗ < δ, which is a
consequence of aP Â a∗P , aP (again see Remark 1).
Next, suppose first that aP ¹ a∗P . Then δ∗ < δM follows directly from Remark 2. Second,
suppose that aP Â a∗P . Then δ ≤ δM follows directly from the definition of δM . Then to
demonstrate that δ = δM iﬀ a˜P º aP Â aP Â a∗P , note first from Assumption (A5) that a˜P º aP
if and only if πdi (aP ) ≤ 0, implying that πdi (am) − πdi (aP ) ≥ πdi (am). Since π = πm − πdi (am)
by definition, we have δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π =
πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)
. Hence πdi (am) − πdi (aP ) ≥ πdi (am) implies
that δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)
≥ δ0 ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
, implying that δM = δ (by definition), as needed.
This result establishes that, when aP Â a∗P , aP , and additional punishment periods are in-
troduced, the lowest discount factor δM that permits the implementation of am cannot be as
low as δ∗, and can attain δ only in particular circumstances. In other words, when regime 3
applies in the single-period scheme, a delayed punishment with discounting oﬀers an imper-
fect substitute for more immediate severity. More precisely, suppose that, absent the (multi-
period) severity constraint (MSC ), regime 1 would apply. Then recall from Remark 2 that the
only punishment profile allowing firms to implement collusion when δ = δ∗, a lower bound, is
a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am). Introducing a severity constraint such that regime 3 applies obviously
does not help, since it makes a∗P unattainable in the first punishment period. In that case a
longer punishment phase permits firms to increase the total punishment, and thereby facilitates
collusion in that it results in a discount threshold δM that is lower than δ. However the incentive
constraints that impact the strategy set in all punishment periods (they impose the diﬀerence
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πdi (aP,s) − π(aP,s) to be relatively small, all s ≤ l) do not allow δM to attain the lower bound
δ∗.
Suppose now that, absent the severity constraint, regime 2 would apply. In that case,
recalling that aP is implicitly defined by π = πm − πdi (am), it is straightforward to observe
from the comparison of the expressions of δ and δ0, as displayed in Proposition 3 and Lemma
7 respectively, that the two thresholds coincide if and only if πdi (aP ) = 0, or equivalently
aP = a˜P . When punishments cannot be very severe, in that aP Â a˜P , firms earn positive profits
by deviating from the punishment “floor” (i.e., πdi (aP ) > 0, see Assumption 6). In that case
there is no finite number of punishment periods that allow firms to implement am for a discount
level as low as δ. That is, δM > δ. On the other hand, when the most severe punishment is
such that firms cannot break even by deviating, so that their minmax profit is negative (i.e.,
πdi (aP ) ≤ 0), by lengthening the punishment phase they may implement am for any discount
level greater than or equal to δ, that is δM = δ.
The next section illustrates the latter results and their interpretation in the context of a
linear example.
5 A Linear Example
The example studied in this section emphasizes the importance of considering limited severity
constraints. In a standard linear oligopoly structure, we investigate the circumstances which
allow firms to sustain perfect collusion (i.e., to maximize joint profits). Toward this aim, we
assume that, over all periods, demand is derived from a utility function adapted from Häckner
(2000), of the form
U(q, I) =
nX
i=1
qi −
1
2
⎛
⎝
nX
i=1
q2i + 2γ
X
i6=j
qiqj
⎞
⎠+ I, (8)
which is quadratic in the consumption of q-products and linear in the consumption of the com-
posite I-good (i.e., the numeraire).12 The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) measures product substitutability
as perceived by consumers. If γ → 0, the demand for the diﬀerent product varieties are inde-
pendent and each firm has monopolistic market power, while if γ → 1, the products are perfect
substitutes. Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
P
piqi+I ≤ m, where
12 In Häckner (2000), quantities qi are multiplied by a parameter ai, that is a measure of the distinctive quality
of each variety i. Here we exclude vertical product diﬀerentiation by assuming that ai = 1, all i ∈ N .
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m denotes income, pi is the non-negative price of product i, and the price of the composite good
is normalized to one. By symmetry, we note
P
j 6=i qj = (n − 1)qj . On the cost side, in the
example we set f = 0, for simplicity, and c < 1. We examine the Cournot version of the model.
With quantity-setting firms, the relation q0 is more severe than q is formally equivalent to q0 ≥ q.
From (8) firm i’s inverse demand function in each period is
pi(qi, qj) = sup{0, 1− qi − γ(n− 1)qj}, (9)
and the inverse demand for each other symmetric firm j in N\{i} is
pj(qi, qj) = sup {0, 1− γqi − (1 + γ(n− 2))qj} , (10)
all qi, qj ≥ 0, i 6= j. It is straightforward to check that a firm’s profit function is continuous and
the associated maximization problem is convex.
Which of the three regimes we identified in Proposition 1 applies depends on the status of
the participation and severity constraints. This in turn depends on the number of firms, the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and the marginal (and unit) cost. The connection of the latter
cost parameter to the severity constraint, is very intuitive in this example. With linear demand
(the quantity demanded is finite at all prices), the most severe punishment is obtained when the
price charged by all firms is equal to zero. This may result in exactly zero profits if the marginal
cost is equal to zero as well, or to losses if the price-cost margin is negative, all other things (i.e.,
the demand to each firm) remaining equal. Whether the endogenous q∗P or qP , as defined above
(by simply substituting q for a) is less or more severe than qP can thus be seen to depend only
on the comparison of c with a threshold level, we denote by c, which is a function of n and γ.
In the specific algebraic context of this example, we may check that (PC ) binds if and only
if qP ≤ q˜P , where q˜P = (1− c) / [γ (n− 1)] is computed by solving πd(q) = 0 (see Assumption
(A5)). Note that, in the absence of fixed costs, we have q˜P = qˆP (see Assumption (A6)).
Observe that, because of the absence of fixed costs, deviation profits here cannot be negative
(a firm may stop producing to earn zero benefit). Moreover (SC ) binds if and only if qP ≤ qP ,
where qP = 1/ [1 + γ(n− 1)] is obtained by solving pi(q, q) = 0. This is because, in the absence
of regulatory intervention, the lower bound to punishment profits results from the non-negativity
constraint in prices (it binds when quantities are suﬃciently large, because demand is finite).
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In the appendix we compute a three-part expression of a continuous frontier c, which depends
on n and γ, so that c = 0 if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ, c = c0 > 0 if γˆ < γ ≤ γˇ, and c = c00 > c0 otherwise, with
γˆ ≡ 2/ (n− 1) and γˇ ≡ 2
¡
1 +
√
2
¢
/ (n− 1), all n. This leads to a partition of the parameter
space (n, γ, c) into three subsets, one for each regime.
Proposition 6. Given c, n, γ :
1) Regime 1 applies if and only if
(i) 2 ≤ n ≤ 3; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; c0 ≤ c < 1; or
(iii) 6 ≤ n; 0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; c0 ≤ c < 1.
2) Regime 2 applies if and only if
6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; c00 ≤ c < 1.
3) Regime 3 applies if and only if
(i) n = 3; γ = γˆ = 1; c = c = 0; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c0; or
(iii) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; 0 ≤ c ≤ c0; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c00.
Proof. See the appendix.
If the constant unit cost is suﬃciently high (formally, c ≥ c), either regime 1, where neither
(PC ) nor (SC ) binds, or regime 2, where (PC ) binds, applies. The former case may hold for all
n ≥ 2, while the second cannot arise if n < 6. Regime 3 is ruled out only if n = 2. Otherwise,
when goods are suﬃciently substitutable (γ ≥ γˆ), and for all numbers of firms, Proposition 6
indicates that a suﬃciently large reduction in c will always result in a shift to regime 3, where
(SC ) binds. If n ≥ 6, all three regimes may apply, depending on the values of γ and c. Fig. 3
precisely illustrates this point.13
13 In this figure, γ < (=)γˇ is equivalent to q∗P < (=)q˜P (see the appendix). Hence it is also equivalent to
q∗P < (=)qP , from Lemma 4.
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Figure 3: Collusion regimes in plane (c, γ) for n ≥ 6. The severity constraint binds in the grey area (regime 3).
At any point (n, γ, c) where Regime 3 applies, as represented by the grey area in Fig. 3, the
collusive quantity qm is implementable for all δ ≥ δM , whenever firms may design an l-period
punishment scheme. This illustrates Proposition 4. Moreover, as an illustration of Proposition 5,
the grey area can be partitioned into three subsets that describe the consequences of introducing
a multi-period punishment scheme. For all points below the frontier c00 and above the frontier
q˜P = qP (so that q˜P ≤ qP together with f = 0 imply π
d
i
³
qP
´
= 0), we have δM = δ. Then firms
may implement am for all δ ≥ δM = δ with a multi-period punishment. Second, in the grey area
below the frontier q˜P = qP (in which case q˜P > qP implies π
d
i
³
qP
´
> 0) and for γ ≥ γˇ, we have
δM > δ. In that case firms cannot implement am for a discount level as low as δ. Eventually,
for γ < γˇ and below c0, we have qP < q
∗
P ≤ qP , hence δ∗ < δM < δ. In words, the severity
constraint binds, and several punishments with discounting are only an imperfect substitute for
severity in the first period.
The latter figure also helps identifying the role of fixed cost. When f = 0, one can check that
(IC2) simplifies to the same expression as (PC ). This does not hold whenever f > 0.14 In that
14 If f = 0 we have πdi (qP ) = −f = 0 for all qP ≥ q˜P = qˆP . In that case, the solution to the δ-minimization
problem in qP , under (IC1) and (IC2) only, is the same as the solution under (IC1) and (PC ). If f > 0 the
constraint (PC ) becomes stronger than (IC2) for all qP ≥ q˜P , with qˆP > q˜P (see assumptions (A5) and (A6)).
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case all incentive constraints, together with the severity constraint, remain unchanged. The only
diﬀerence is that the future stream of profits a firm earns from the first period of punishment
onward is reduced by the magnitude of fixed costs, so that the participation constraint becomes
stronger. Hence the parameter subset where regime 2 applies expands. This has no impact on
the discount thresholds δ∗, δ, and δ which correspond to each regime. They are displayed as
expressions of parameters, together with δM < δ.
An interesting aspect of Proposition 6 is that the severity constraint can be ignored for
all values of c and γ if there are exactly two or three firms (see Regime 1-(i)). In that case,
the results obtained in the literature on the implementation of collusion with a duopoly and a
constant marginal (and unit) cost normalized to zero are robust to the introduction of a positive
constant unit cost, all other specifications remaining the same. This does not apply when n > 3.
It is also of interest to compare our result in Proposition 6 with Abreu (1986), where there is
no limited severity constraint. In that reference paper, the model is a Cournot oligopoly with a
strictly positive constant unit cost, homogenous goods, and a quantity demanded that tends to
infinity when the price approaches zero, as specified in ( eA1)-( eA3) we reproduced above. Then
the collusive qm can be implemented with a two-phase penal code that includes one punishment
period only, for all numbers of firms and a given discount factor δ above a threshold. Provided
that δ ≥ δ∗, where is δ∗ is as defined in (2), Proposition 6 extends the latter result to our specific
example for any non-negative constant unit cost, and for any degree of product diﬀerentiation,
if there are at most three firms. This is remarkable since our linear demand specification is not
a special case of Abreu’s class of demand functions. However, with more than three firms, the
values of c and/or of γ drive the status of the constraints in the δ-minimization problem. We
obtain that c and/or γ must be higher than a threshold for a single-period punishment scheme
to implement collusion at δ = δ∗ or δ = δ.15
The role of costs, given n and γ, can be illustrated by comparing q∗P and qP with qP for any
c defined on [0, 1]. The punishment quantities are represented for all n ≥ 6 again, with highly
substitutable products in Fig. 4(a), where γˇ < γ, and for more diﬀerentiated products in Fig.
4(b), where γ < γˆ. In both cases regime 3 applies when the constant cost parameter is low, that
We may also assume that f < 0 to capture the existence of a profitable outside option. In this case (PC ) is
weaker than with a non-negative fixed cost.
15This result contrasts even more sharply with trigger penal code models, in which one can easily check that
the sustainability of collusion is not directly connected to the level of marginal costs (at least in the linear cost
setup).
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is c ≤ c. For higher levels of c we have regime 2 in (a), and regime 1 in (b). The structural
boundary level qP depends only on the number of competitors and demand parameters. It is
monotone decreasing when either n or γ increases, but constant in c. The optimal punishment
quantities q∗P and qP are linear in the cost parameter and monotone decreasing when it rises
closer to 1.
)(a
1=c
Pq
PP qq ˆ~ = Pq
P
q
0 cc ′′=
regime 3 regime 2
mq
1=c
Pq
mq
Pq*
P
q
0 cc ′=
regime 3 regime 1 )(b
PP qq ˆ~ =
Figure 4: Thick lines represent optimal punishment quantities (all c, and n ≥ 6). In (a) products are highly
substitutable (γˇ < γ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c00, and regime 2 applies otherwise. In (b) products are more
diﬀerentiated (γ < γˇ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c0, and regime 1 applies otherwise.
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We now turn to the impact of a change in the diﬀerentiation parameter γ, or in the number
of firms n, on the discount factor thresholds δ∗, δ, δ, and δM , and also on the cost threshold c.
From the algebraic expressions displayed in the appendix, it is easy to establish the following
monotonicity properties.
Proposition 7. Given n, γ, c :
(i) c0 and c00 are monotone increasing in n and γ;
(ii) δ∗ and δ are monotone increasing in n and γ;
(iii) δ and δM are monotone increasing in n and γ, and monotone decreasing in c.
Proof. It suﬃces to diﬀerentiate the functional forms that appear in the appendix.
This proposition establishes that the constant unit cost frontier c, together with the lowest
values of δ for which the collusive quantity qm can be implemented, all evolve in the same
direction when parameter values change. We find that an increase in product diﬀerentiation,
and a reduction in the number of firms, facilitate collusion, as they both relax the conditions on
c and δ.
6 The Related Literature
A limited severity constraint, as introduced in this paper, plays no role in models à la Friedman
(1971) where, in case of deviation from the collusive action, trigger strategies call for reversion
to the one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever (see for example Deneckere (1983, 1984),
Majerus (1988), Chang (1991), Ross (1992), Häckner (1994)). In these models (SC ) cannot
bind since aP ≺ aNE by definition. By specifying that firms revert to the Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot stage game in all periods subsequent to a deviation, one actually rules out the
possibility of modulating the level of punishments in a range where the severity constraint is
defined.
A limited severity constraint may impact firms’ ability to sustain collusion in more elaborate
models that formalize a stick-and-carrot penal code in the spirit of Abreu (1986, 1988). A series
of papers in this category investigate the impact of product diﬀerentiation and industry con-
centration on the sustainability of collusive agreements in oligopolistic industries. An example
33
is Wernerfelt (1989), where more product diﬀerentiation may render collusion less sustainable
when the number of quantity-setting oligopolists is relatively large.16 In a repeated Bertrand
(i.e., price-setting) model with two firms, spatial horizontal diﬀerentiation, and a constant mar-
ginal cost set equal to zero, Häckner (1996) demonstrates that there exists an optimal symmetric
stick-and-carrot punishment scheme, and confirms that diﬀerentiation tends to facilitate collu-
sive agreements. It is also demonstrated that, when the punishment price is constrained to be
non-negative, a prolonged price war is an optimal collusive strategy. However in this case there
cannot be below cost pricing, a restriction that does not fit most real-world circumstances. Our
paper extends the analysis to positive marginal costs, and reveals they do impact firms’ abil-
ity to sustain collusion. With two firms and constant marginal costs again, but with another
specification of the horizontal diﬀerentiation assumption, Lambertini and Sasaki (2002) find a
qualitatively similar relationship between product substitutability and collusion sustainability.
This is obtained in a setup where quantities are constrained to be non-negative but prices may
fall below zero. The example in the previous section extends this result to a linear setup with
n firms, when the severity constraint imposes prices to be non-negative. Lambertini and Sasaki
also find that, for all degrees of product diﬀerentiation, perfect collusion is less easily sustain-
able in Bertrand than in Cournot. We confirm this result in the Bertrand version of our linear
example of the previous section (with 0 < γ < 1), by finding that, for any degree of product
diﬀerentiation and all numbers of firms, the frontier c and the discount thresholds in all three
regimes are higher with price-setting firms than with Cournot players, all other things remaining
equal. In other words, for some points in (n, γ, c) regime 3 applies with Bertrand firms, while
either regime 1 or 2 occurs with Cournot competition (so that collusion is easier to sustain). The
intuition is that incentives to deviate in the Bertrand case are higher than in the Cournot setup,
because a deviating firm can capture the whole demand in a price-setting oligopoly. This does
not apply in a quantity-setting oligopoly, because a unilateral expansion in some firm’s output
cannot eliminate its rivals’ demand. On the other hand, the severity of punishments does not
depend on the nature of competition, but only on structural parameters (that is n, γ, and c in
our example). More precisely, the range of per-period punishment profits remains the same in
the Bertrand and Cournot cases (they cannot be less than −cq).
Another strand of literature investigates the impact of cost asymmetries on collusion. Compte,
Jenny, Rey (2002) capitalize on early characterizations by Lambson (1987, 1994) of optimal
16Although of interest, this ambiguous result is derived from demand assumptions (adapted from Deneckere,
1983) which are not standard (on this see Osterdal, 2003, pp. 54-55).
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punishments — possibly over several periods — for a class of infinitely-repeated games with price-
setting sellers of a homogenous good. They examine the impact of the distribution of firm-specific
capacity constraints on the ability to sustain collusion. When capacity constraints are weak, in
that any subset of firms can serve the entire market, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game
also yields zero profit. When aggregate capacity is limited vis-à-vis market size, it is shown
that asymmetric capacities make collusion more diﬃcult to sustain. With no fixed cost, and
a constant marginal cost normalized to zero, firms earn zero profit when they are minmaxed.
This holds also when the price is set to zero. Hence the severity constraint associated to price
non-negativity can never be binding. Our analysis reveals that another factor would be at play if
the marginal cost were specified to be positive. In that case the severity constraint would depend
on each firm i’s capacity ki, with the lowest profit equal to −cki < 0, and it could be binding. In
Vasconcelos (2005), quantity-setting firms have a diﬀerent share of the industry capital, which
determines their marginal costs. In a punishment period, the total industry output is divided
in proportion to capital endowments. The analysis focuses on maximum punishments. They
make a deviant firm earn its minmax payoﬀ, that is zero (there are no fixed costs), from the
first period of punishment onward. In the terms used in the present paper, this is equivalent
to assuming that firms’ punishment quantities are such that the participation constraint binds.
When this holds, an important result is that a two-phase stick-and-carrot penal code exists,
where the collusive action leads to monopoly profits (perfect collusion), if the discount factor
is higher than a threshold level that depends on the size of the largest firm. The introduction
of our severity constraint — which is a natural extension since demand is finite so that punish-
ments are structurally limited from below — would lead to a higher threshold for some parameter
values. By choosing simple values for the cost and demand parameters in Vasconcelos (2005),
we find that the above mentioned discount threshold remains unchanged only if the marginal
cost parameter is suﬃciently high. More specifically, by setting (say) ki = 1/n for each firm
i’s capital share (so that symmetry is restored), and a = b = 1 for the linear demand curve
parameters, one obtains that qP < qP if and only if c > sup {0, c(δ)}, where qP is the quantity
such that both (IC1) and (PC ), as defined in the present paper, are exactly satisfied, and qP is
the quantity that drives prices to zero.17
17With ki = 1/n and a = b = 1, the discount threshold of Proposition 2 in Vasconcelos (2005, p. 48) reduces
to 3 (n+ 2)n/ (2n+ 1)2. With δ at the latter level, we obtain c(δ) = 1/n.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Single-Period Punishments
Lemma 1. The optimal single-period punishment action a∗P and the discount factor lower bound
δ∗ are such that (IC1) and (IC2) hold with equality.
Proof. Suppose that a = a∗P , the optimal punishment, and δ = δ
∗, the lowest possible discount
factor for which am is implementable. There are three possible cases: either the two inequalities
are slack, or only one, or none. Consider the first two cases in turn. (i) If none of the two
constraints binds, observe that the two expressions on the right-hand side of the inequality sign
are continuous in δ and monotonically decreasing when the discount parameter is decreasing,
so that there exists δ0 < δ∗ such that the system still holds true when δ = δ0, contradicting the
claim that δ∗ is a lower bound. (ii) If exactly one constraint binds for δ = δ0 < δ∗, recall that
profit functions πdi (.) and π(.) are continuous in firms’ choices, therefore by changing slightly
the punishment action from a∗P to a
0
P one can relax the binding constraint and still let the other
inequality be verified. This leads the two constraints (IC1) and (IC2) to be slack, implying
again that there exists δ00 < δ0 such that the system still holds true when δ = δ00. It follows from
(i) and (ii) that both constraints must be binding.
Proposition 1. The collusive action am is implementable with a single-period punishment if
and only if δ ≥ δ∗1, with
δ∗1 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
δ∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π(a∗P )
if a∗P º aP , aP (regime 1);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º aP , a∗P (regime 2);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º a∗P , aP (regime 3).
Proof. There are three steps. First we solve a less constrained version of (1), in which (PC )
and (SC ) are absent. Then we reintroduce each of the latter two constraints separately.
1) Consider the δ-minimization problem without constraints (PC ) and (SC ). The two
constraints (IC1-IC2) can be rewritten together as
X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ) , (11)
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where X (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and Y (δ, aP ) ≡
£
πm − πdi (aP )
¤
/ (1− δ) denote the lower-
bound and the upper-bound, respectively, of the profit diﬀerential πm − π(aP ). (They are
represented in Fig. 2.) We know that (a∗P , δ
∗) solves X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) from Lemma 1.18
Together with πdi (am)− πdi (a∗P ) = πm − π(a∗P ) from Lemma 2, this leads to
δ∗ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π(a∗P )
. (12)
2) Introduce (PC ) in addition to (IC1-IC2). For aP = a∗P recall that the latter two con-
straints imply X (δ) ≤ πm− π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P ), while PC can be rewritten πm− π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ),
with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P then a˜P ≺ a∗P , from Lemma 4. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) > Y (δ, a∗P )
for all δ ∈ [0, 1), and the participation constraint is slack for aP = a∗P and δ = δ∗.
(ii) If a∗P ¹ aP then a∗P ¹ a˜P , from Lemma 4. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) ≤
Y (δ, a∗P ) for all δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict (PC ) is violated for aP = a∗P
and δ = δ∗. Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute (PC ) for (IC2), or
equivalently Y (δ) for Y (δ, aP ) in (11). (See Fig. 2.) The negative slope of X (δ), together with
the monotonicity of π(aP ), imply that the minimizer aP and the minimum δ verify X
¡
δ
¢
=
πm − π = Y
¡
δ
¢
.19 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π
, (13)
and then one checks that Y
¡
δ
¢
≤ Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
.
(iii) Clearly if aP Â (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also verifies (SC ).
3) Introduce (SC ), in addition to (IC1-IC2). Then for aP = a∗P , the severity constraint can
be rewritten πm − π(a∗P ) ≤ Y , where Y ≡ πm − π. There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P we have π < π (a∗P ), hence (SC ) is slack for aP = a∗P , all δ.
18Deviation profits πdi (aP ) have a lower bound (a firm may always stop selling; see (A6)), all aP . Therefore
limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0, aP ) = πm − πdi (aP ), and X (1) = πdi (am) − πm < limδ→1 Y (δ, aP ) = +∞. Hence
there always exists δ∗(aP ) in [0, 1) verifying X (δ∗(aP )) = Y (δ∗(aP ), aP ), all aP .
19Note that limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0) = πm together with limδ→1X (δ) = πdi (am) − πm < limδ→1 Y (δ) =
+∞ imply that there always exists δ in [0, 1) verifying X
?
δ
?
= Y
?
δ
?
.
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(ii) If a∗P ¹ aP , we know from (SC ) that Y ≤ X (δ∗) = πm − π(a∗P ) = Y (δ∗, a∗P ). When the
inequality sign is strict (SC ) is violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a severity-
constrained solution, one substitutes (SC ) for (IC2), or equivalently Y for Y (δ, aP ) in (11).
(See Fig. 2.) Since Y is a constant and πm − π(aP ) reaches a maximum for aP = aP , the
minimum δ verifies X (δ) = Y .20 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π
. (14)
Then a∗P ¹ aP ¹ am together with assumption (A7) imply that δ ≥ π
d
i (aP )−π
πm−π , hence that
Y ≤ Y (δ, aP ).
(iii) Clearly if aP Â (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also verifies (PC ).
7.2 Multi-Period Punishments
Lemma 5. Given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ verifying (MIC 1-MIC 2) results from pun-
ishment actions aP,k ¹ am, with k > 1 (where at least one punishment action is strictly more
severe than am), such that the two multi-period incentive constraints (MIC 1) and (MIC 2) bind.
Proof. In (MIC 1, the expression on the right-hand side of the weak inequality sign simplifies
to
Xl+1
k=1
δk [πm − π(aP,k)]. It is clearly monotone increasing when either aP,k decreases, all
k ≥ 1, or when δ increases, the left-hand side expression (which does not depend on punishment
levels) remaining constant. In (MIC 2), the expression on the right-hand side of the weak
inequality sign can be rewritten δ [(1− δ)V1 (aP , δ)− π (aP,1)]. It is monotone increasing when
aP,k increases (since δ (1− δ) > 0), for all k > 1, the left-hand side expression (a function of
aP,1 only) remaining constant. Then for any given aP,1, suppose that aP,2, . . . , aP,l are such
that δ takes the lowest possible value for which (MIC 1-MIC 2) hold true. There are three
possible cases: either the two inequalities are slack, or only one, or none. (i) If none of the two
constraints binds, by continuity, one may obviously reduce δ by an arbitrarily small amount so
that both constraints remain verified, contradicting the claim that there is no lower discount
factor verifying (MIC 1) and (MIC 2). (ii) If exactly one of the two constraints binds, pick
any k > 1 such that aP,k ≺ am. Then by continuity, one may reduce δ and adjust aP,k so
20Since X (δ) is downward sloping, and limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > X, there exists δ in [0, 1) verifying X (δ) = Y if
and only if limδ→1X (δ) < Y . We focus here on situations in which this holds. Otherwise am is not implementable.
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that the right-hand side expression of the binding constraint remains constant, while the other
constraint remains satisfied, contradicting again the initial supposition. Therefore it must be
the case that, given aP,1, (MIC 1-MIC 2) hold with an equality sign when aP,2, . . . , aP,l are such
that δ is minimized.
Proposition 2. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if a∗P º aP , aP the collusive action am
is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ∗, and a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps: (1) We investigate a less constrained version of (7) by leaving aside
the last l− 1 multi-period incentive constraints together with (MPC ) and (MSC ), to keep only
(MIC 1) and (MIC 2). This is done by capitalizing on Lemma 5: we solve in (δ, V1) the system
(MIC 1-MIC 2) with equality signs, to obtain (δ∗(aP,1), V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))); then we identify the
level of aP,1 that minimizes δ∗(aP,1) under the feasibility constraint that V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)) ≤
Vl (aP , δ∗(aP,1)) = πm/ (1− δ∗(aP,1)). This leads to the minimizer a∗P,1 = a∗P . (2) We show
that (δ∗(a∗P ), V1(aP , δ
∗(a∗P ))) satisfies all incentive constraints in (MIC 1-MIC l+1) as well as
(MPC -MSC ).
(1) Consider the δ-minimization problem with the two incentive constraints (MIC 1) and (MIC 2)
only. Observing that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), the two constraints become
X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ, aP,1) , (15)
where X (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and Y (δ, aP,1) ≡
£
πm − πdi (aP,1)
¤
/ (1− δ) denote the lower-
bound and the upper-bound, respectively, of the value diﬀerential V0 (am, δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =
V0 (am, δ)−π (aP,1)− δV1 (aP , δ). Given aP,1, from Lemma 5 we know that (15) must hold with
an equality sign throughout for δ to be minimized. Solving X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) in (δ, V1(aP , δ)),
we find
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
, (16)
and
V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)) =
h
πdi (am)− πdi
¡
a∗P,1
¢i⎛⎝πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
− π
³
a∗P,1
´
πdi (am)− πm
+
πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
πm − πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
⎞
⎠ . (17)
Observe from the monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (Lemma 3) that δ
∗(aP,1) is monotone non-
decreasing in aP,1. Therefore the lowest value of δ∗(aP,1) is obtained for the most severe first-
period punishment aP,1 compatible with the feasibility constraints of the problem. Note in
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particular from (5) that aP,1 must be such that Vs (aP , δ) ≤ Vt (aP , δ) ≤ Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ),
all s ≤ t ≤ l. Then V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/ (1− δ), together with (16) and (17), becomesh
πm − πdi (aP,1)
iµ
1− π
d
i (aP,1)− π (aP,1)
πdi (am)− πm
¶
≥ 0. (18)
Clearly πm − πdi (aP,1) for all aP,1 ¹ aNE (since the monotonicity of πdi (aP ) implies that
πdi (aP,1) ≤ πdi (aNE) = π(aNE), while π(aNE) < πm for all aNE ≺ am). It follows from
(18) that the term between rounded brackets must be non-negative. This implies that
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ πdi (am)− πm. (19)
Recalling from Lemma 2 that πdi (a
∗
P )−π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)−πm, from Assumption (A7) we obtain
that aP,1 cannot be strictly more severe than a∗P .
(2) Substitute a∗P for aP,1 in (16 − 17), and also πdi (am) − πm for πdi (a∗P ) − π(a∗P ), again from
Lemma 2, to obtain
δ∗(a∗P ) = δ
∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi
¡
a∗P
¢ ,
and
V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) =
πm
1− δ∗ .
It follows directly from the later equation that V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) = Vl(aP , δ
∗(a∗P )), implying that
π
³
a∗P,k
´
= πm, all k > 1. This says that a∗P = (a
∗
P , am, . . . , am) when the only the two
incentive constraints in (MIC 1) and (MIC 2 are considered. Next, observe from the definition
of continuation profits in (5) that a∗P,k = am, all k > 1, implies that V1 (a
∗
P , δ) = Vs (a
∗
P , δ),
all s. It follows that the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints are all identical to the
first one, that is (MIC 1), implying that all constraints in (MIC 1-MIC l+1) are satisfied. Since
a∗P º aP , aP it is also plain that (MPC ) and (MSC ) are satisfied. Therefore the solution to
the less constrained problem is also a solution to (7), and the punishment (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is
optimal.
Proposition 3. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º aP , a∗P , the collusive action
am is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π , and aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps: (1) In addition to (MIC 1) and (MIC 2), we introduce (MPC ) in the
less constrained version of (7), the last l−1 multi-period incentive constraints and (MSC ) being
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left aside. We show that (MPC ) is stronger than (IC2) if a∗P ¹ a˜P . Then am is implementable
with the l-period punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) if δ = δ, that is the lower bound to the
interval of δ for which (MIC 1) and (MPC ) are compatible. (2) We obtain that (δ,aP ) satisfies
all other incentive constraints (MIC3-MICl+ 1), in which case δ is a solution of (7) and aP is
optimal.
(1) Introduce the multi-period participation constraint (MPC ) in addition to (MIC 1-MIC l+1).
For aP = a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) recall that the first two incentive constraints in (MIC 1) and
(MIC 2) can be rewritten X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ) − V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ,a∗P ), while (MPC ) can be
rewritten V0 (am, δ) − V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If aP º a∗P we know from
Lemma 4 that a˜P º a∗P , in which case πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 from (A5). This implies that Y (δ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P )
for any δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict (MPC ) is stronger than (MIC 2), and thus is
violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute
(MPC ) for (MIC 2). From Proposition 1, in the single-period punishment case we know that
(IC1) and (PC ) are satisfied if aP = aP and δ ≥ δ, implying that in the multi-period setup
(MIC 1) and (MPC ) are satisfied as well if aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) and δ ≥ δ. This is suﬃcient
to conclude that there is at least one punishment aP for which am is implementable with δ ≥ δ.
Then recall from Lemma 6 that δ is the lowest value of δ compatible with (MIC 1 and (MPC ).
This is suﬃcient to conclude that δ is a solution to the δ-minimization problem under the
constraints (MIC 1), (MIC 2), (MPC ).
(2) Observe from the definition of continuation profits in (5) that aP,k = am for all k > 1 implies
that Vs (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), all s > 1. It follows the last l− 1 multi-period incentive constraints
are all identical to (MIC 1), implying that all constraints in (MIC 1-MIC l+1) are satisfied.
Clearly if aP Â (=)aP , then
¡
δ,aP
¢
also verifies (MSC ). Therefore δ is a solution to (7), and
the punishment (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal, all l.
Lemma 8. For all V verifying π < (1− δ)V ≤ πm, there exists a finite l and a punishment
aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l), with aP,k º aP for all k > 1, such that V1 (aP , δ) = V .
Proof. There are three steps: (1) we show that, given any δ, for any l ≥ 2 there exists a
punishment alP of length l such that V1 (aP , δ) = V for any V in a closed interval Il we define;
(2) we establish that the upper-bound of Il+1 is the lower bound of Il so that their finite union
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IL = ∪Ll=1Il is itself a closed interval; (3) we conclude by evidencing that the lower and upper
bounds of the union of intervals are respectively π/ (1− δ) and πm/ (1− δ).
(1) Define alP ≡ (alP,1, alP,2, . . . , alP,k, . . . , alP,l), where alP,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and
alP º aP . Here firms opt for the most severe action aP in the first l − 1 periods, and for a
possibly softer action in the l-th period. In the latter final period, the continuity of π in alP
implies that π(alP ) may take any value in [π(aP ), πm]. Let a
l
P and a
l
P denote the just defined
penal code alP where a
l
P,l = aP and a
l
P,l = am respectively. By definition, for any value V in
Il = [V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
], there exists alP such that V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V .
(2) Clearly, V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V1
³
al+1P , δ
´
so that IL = ∪Ll=1Il = [V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
] for any
integer L > 1, and
(3) from the definition of continuation profits in (5) we know that V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
= πm/ (1− δ),
while V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
verifies
(1− δ)V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
= π + δl−1 (πm − π) .
Since limL→∞(π + δL−1 (πm − π)) = π, for any V > π/ (1− δ) there exists a finite L such
that π + δL−1 (πm − π) ≤ (1− δ)V so that V ∈ [V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
], and there exists a
punishment profile alP , with l ≤ L, such that V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V .
Remark 3. If aP Â a∗P there is an infinite number of punishments that permit firms to imple-
ment am for δ = δ.
Proof. Recall from proof of Proposition 3 that (MIC 1) is written as X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ) −
V0 (aP , δ), and (MPC ) as V0 (am, δ) − V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ), with X (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and
Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If (aP , δ) = (aP , δ) and aP Â a∗P we know that X
¡
δ
¢
= V0
¡
am, δ
¢
−
V0
¡
aP , δ
¢
= Y (δ), where aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am), while all other multi-period incentive con-
straints are satisfied also. Given δ, consider a change from aP to a0P , with a
0
P,1 Â aP and
a0P,k ¹ am for some k > 1, that verifies V0 (aP , δ)−V0 (a0P , δ) = 0. For all l > 1, the continuity of
π(aP,k) in aP,k implies that the number of solutions a0P to the latter equation is infinite. By the
very nature of the change both constraints (MIC 1) and (MPC ) remain exactly satisfied, while
by continuity (MIC 2) remains satisfied as well for a suﬃciently small adjustment (it was slack
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for aP,1 = aP ). Moreover, the l − 1 remaining multi-period incentive constraints in (MIC3-
MICl+1) are relaxed as a result of an adjustment from am “down” to a0P,k ≺ am in any of the
k > 1 following periods of punishment, all other things remaining equal. It follows that am is
implementable if (aP , δ) = (a0P , δ).
Proposition 4. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º a∗P , aP , there exists a finite
l > 1 such that the collusive action am is implementable if and only if δ ≥ sup{δ0, δ} ≡ δM .
Proof. There are two cases that depend on the comparison of δ0 and δ. In both cases: (1) we
establish that there exists a finite punishment, we denote aP , which is such that V1 (aP , δ) is
equal to a particular value we explicit; (2) we check that all incentive constraints are satisfied;
(3) we also verify that the participation and severity constraints hold.
(δ ≤ δ0)
(1) Define implicitly aP , specified to take the form of a
l
P as introduced in Lemma 8 (so that
(MSC ) is satisfied) by
V1 (aP , δ) =
1
1− δ
µ
π +
πdi (aP )− π
δ
¶
(20)
which describes continuation profits from the 2nd period of punishment onward. Given δ, from
Lemma 8, a suﬃcient condition for aP to be well defined is π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm. To
check this holds, consider the two inequalities in turn: (i) We have π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) since£
πdi (aP )− π
¤
/δ > 0 (by definition). (ii) Toward V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/(1−δ) first note that aP º a∗P
implies that πdi (am) − πm ≥ πdi (aP ) − π(aP ) from Assumption (A7) and Lemma 2. From the
expression of δ0, as displayed in Lemma 7, it follows that
δ0 ≤ π
d
i (am)− πm
πm − π(aP )
. (21)
Then pick δ = δ0. Now (21), and X
¡
δ0
¢
≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ0 = V0
¡
am, δ0
¢
− V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢, imply
that πm − π(aP ) ≤ V0
¡
am, δ0
¢
− V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢. Moreover, substituting ¡1− δ0¢V0 ¡am, δ0¢ for πm
in the latter expression leads to V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢ ≤ δ0V0 ¡am, δ0¢+ π(aP ). Then substituting π(aP ) +
δ0V1
¡
aP , δ
0¢ for V0 ¡aP , δ0¢ results in ¡1− δ0¢V1 ¡aP , δ0¢ ≤ πm, as needed. As (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ)
is monotone decreasing in δ, it follows that (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm for all δ ≥ δ0. Eventually, (i)
and (ii) establish that there exists at least one aP for a finite l such that V1 (aP , δ) satisfies (20)
for all δ ≥ δ0.
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(2) At δ = δ0, we have that (MIC 1-MIC 2) are exactly satisfied for aP = aP (which is as defined
in Lemma 8 so that aP,1 = aP ). Clearly, Vk+1 (aP , δ) is strictly increasing in k as long as k ≤ l−1.
Since πdi (aP,k) − π(aP,k) is identical for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, if (MIC 2) holds and is binding, it
must be the case that all constraints (MIC3) , . . . , (MICl) hold also and are slack. There is no
loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is equality, collusion can be implemented
by the means of a l − 1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 = aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the
case, we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma 2 that πdi (aP,l) − π(aP,l) < πdi (am) − πm. If
(MIC 1 holds and is binding, it must be the case that (MIC l+1) holds also and is slack. This
says that, in the absence of participation constraint, am is implementable with at least one l-
punishment vector, that is aP = aP , when δ = δ
0. Since for aP = aP all MICs (MIC 1-MIC l+1
are monotone increasing in δ, this also holds for all δ ≥ δ0.
(3) Consider now the participation constraint. If δ ≤ δ0, then the comparison of the developed
expressions for the two thresholds implies that πdi (am)−πdi (aP ) ≤ πm−π. Since π = πm−πdi (am)
by definition, we have πdi (aP ) ≥ 0. Since V0 (aP , δ) = π+ δV1 (aP , δ), with V1 (aP , δ) as in (20),
and aP as defined above in (1), we have V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0, which says that the participation
constraint (MPC ) is also satisfied for aP = aP and δ ≥ δ0. This says that am is implementable
with a finite punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ0.
Then recall from Lemma 7 that the lowest δ compatible with (MIC 1-MIC 2) and (MSC ) is
δ0. It follows that δ0 is the lowest possible discount factor that implements am.
(δ > δ0)
(1) We proceed as in the previous case to define implicitly a¯P by
V1 (a¯P , δ) = −
π
δ
. (22)
Again, we must check that a¯P satisfies the suﬃcient condition introduced in Lemma 8, that
is π < − (1−δ)δ π ≤ πm, for all δ ≥ δ. The left-hand side inequality is always satisfied for δ ∈ (0, 1].
On the right-hand side, aP º aP implies that π ≥ π = πm−πdi (am). As a result −(
1−δ)
δ
π ≤ πm,
which extends to any δ ≥ δ by monotonicity. Hence there exists at least one a¯P for a finite l
such that V1 (a¯P , δ) satisfies (22) for any δ ≥ δ.
(2) At δ = δ, we check that (MIC 1-MIC 2) are satisfied for aP = a¯P (which is as defined
in Lemma 8, so that aP,1 = aP , and (MSC ) is satisfied by construction). Indeed X
¡
δ
¢
=
44
V0
¡
am, δ
¢
− V0
¡
a¯P , δ
¢
< Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
with X
¡
δ
¢
= πdi (am), Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
= πdi (am)
³
1− π
d
i (aP )
πm
´
>
πdi (am) since π
d
i (aP ) < 0, and V0
¡
am, δ
¢
− V0
¡
a¯P , δ
¢
= V0
¡
am, δ
¢
= πm
1−δ = π
d
i (am). Again,
Vk+1 (a¯P , δ) is strictly increasing in k as long as k ≤ l−1. Since πdi (aP,k)−π(aP,k) is identical for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ l−1, if (MIC 2) is satisfied, it must be the case all constraints (MIC 3) , . . . , (MIC l)
are also satisfied. There is no loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is equality,
collusion can be implemented by the means of a l − 1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 =
aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the case, we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma 2 that
πdi (aP,l) − π(aP,l) < πdi (am) − πm. If (MIC 1 holds and is binding, it must be the case that
(MIC l+1) holds also and is slack. We obtain that all incentive constraints are satisfied. Again,
since for aP = a¯P all MICs (MIC 1-MIC l+1 are monotone increasing in δ, this also holds for
all δ ≥ δ.
(3) By construction, from (22), V0 (a¯P , δ) = 0 hence (MPC ) is satisfied for all δ. Given the
structure of a¯P , (MSC ) is also satisfied. This says that am is implementable with a finite
punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ.
Then recall from Lemma 6 that the lowest δ compatible with (MIC 1-MIC 2) and (MPC ) is
δ. It follows that δ is the lowest possible discount factor that implements am.
7.3 A Linear Example
Inverse demand functions for firm i and all other symmetric firms j are given by (9) and (10).
Therefore symmetric profits are
π(q) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− q (1 + γ(n− 1))− c)q if q ≤ qP ≡
1
(1+γ(n−1))
−cq if q ≥ 11+γ(n−1)
, (23)
where the piecewise structure results from the non-negativity constraint we impose on prices
(solve 1−qi−γ(n−1)qj ≥ 0 for qi = qj = q to find q ≤ qP ≡
1
(1+γ(n−1))). The collusive quantity
and corresponding profits are qm = 1−c2(1+γ(n−1)) and πm =
(1−c)2
4(1+γ(n−1)) , respectively.
The one-shot best deviation profits are
πdi (q) =
(
1
4 (1− c− γ (n− 1) q)
2 if q ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)
0 otherwise
, (24)
45
where q˜P is the solution to πdi (q) = 0 (here f = 0 implies q˜P = qˆP , see (A5) and (A6)). Since
qm < q˜P for all parameter values, firm i’s best-reply profits, when each firm in N\{i} sells qm,
are πdi (qm) =
(1−c)2
16
(γ(n−1)+2)2
(1+γ(n−1))2 , from (24).
For all qP > qm one must consider the two forms of πdi (qP ), that depend on the comparison
of qP with q˜P . This leads to two cases:
(1) If qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply profits are πdi (qP ) =
1
4 (1− c− γ (n− 1)) q)
2 and (PC )
is slack. When only (IC1) and (IC2) are considered, we know (from Lemma 1) that the
optimal punishment q∗P is a solution in qP of π
d
i (qP )− π (qP ) = πdi (qm)− πm. There are
two solutions. The first one is obviously qm, which does not apply as a punishment; the
second one is
q∗P =
1− c
2
3γ(n− 1) + 2
[2 + γ(n− 1)] [1 + γ(n− 1)] .
Here the latter punishment quantity is defined only when lower than q˜P , which holds if
and only if γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}, where γˇ ≡ 21+
√
2
n−1 and inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if and only if n < 6. The
threshold value for δ is
δ∗ =
1
16
[2 + γ (n− 1)]2
1 + γ (n− 1) < 1. (25)
This is Regime 1 (see (2)). Next, we find q∗P ≤ qP , so that the price pi(q
∗
P , q
∗
P ) is non-
negative and (SC ) is slack if and only if c ≥ c0, with
c0 ≡ γ (n− 1)− 2
3γ(n− 1) + 2 .
The frontier c0 intersects the line c = 0 from below at γ = γˆ ≡ 2n−1 . Therefore there exists
c0 > 0 if and only if 2n−1 < 1 (one checks that γˆ < γˇ for all n ≥ 2), or equivalently n > 3,
otherwise c0 = 0 for all parameter values. Whenever c < c0 we have qP < q
∗
P ≤ q˜P and
(SC ) binds. (Here q∗P ≤ q˜P is implied by γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}.) This is regime 3.
(2) If qP > q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply profits are πdi (qP ) = 0 and (IC2) is identically equal to
(PC ). (This holds because f = 0, otherwise f > 0 would imply that (IC2) is strictly
weaker than (PC ).) It follows from the previous case (where qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)) that we
need only consider γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6 to complete the analysis. There are two solutions in
qP to −π (qP ) = πdi (qm) − πm, the equation that defines qP implicitly. The first one is
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strictly less than q˜P for all c < 1, therefore it is not admissible; the second one is then
qP =
1− c
4
2 [1 + γ(n− 1)] + [2 + γ(n− 1)]
p
1 + γ (n− 1)
[1 + γ(n− 1)]2
,
which we check is strictly higher than q˜P for all parameter values. Then the threshold
value for δ now is
δ =
µ
γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
¶2
< 1. (26)
This is Regime 2 (see (2)). Next, we find qP < (=)qP , so that the price pi(qP , qP ) is
non-negative and (SC ) is slack if and only if c > (=)c00, with
c00 ≡
p
1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)]− 2 [1 + γ (n− 1)]p
1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)] + 2 [1 + γ(n− 1)]
.
The frontier c00 intersects from below the line c = 0 if γ = 0, and c00 > 0 otherwise.
Therefore c00 > 0 for all γ ≥ γˇ. Whenever c < c00 we have qP < qP ≤ q
∗
P and (SC ) binds.
(Here qP ≤ q∗P is implied by γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6.) This is regime 3.
The two preceding paragraphs delineate the parameter subsets in which regime 1 and regime
2 apply, respectively. (In the latter case, since f = 0, remark that (IC2) being identical to (PC )
implies that regimes 1 and 2 actually coincide for all points (n, γ, c) verifying n ≥ 6, γˇ ≤ γ ≤
1, and c00 ≤ c < 1.) All points in the parameter set where regime 3 applies were also identified.
In the latter regime, the discount threshold δ solves πdi (qm) − πm = δ
³
πm − π
³
qP
´´
. As the
specific algebraic form of the latter expression does not depend on parameter values, there is a
unique
δ =
1
4
µ
1− c
1 + c
¶2 (n− 1)2 γ2
1 + γ (n− 1) , (27)
all n, γ, c.
It remains to compute δM , the discount threshold when (SC ) binds and firms design the
optimal l-period punishment scheme. We know (from Proposition 4) that δM = sup{δ0, δ}.
Again we know from (24) there are two cases: 1) if qP < q˜P , or equivalently c <
1
1+γ(n−1) , we
have πdi
³
qP
´
= 14
³
1− c− γ (n− 1)) qP
´2
, which implies that
δM =
γ (n− 1) (1− c)2
(1 + c) [4 (1− c)− γ (n− 1) (3c− 1)] > δ; (28)
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and 2) if qP ≥ q˜P , or equivalently c ≥
1
1+γ(n−1) , we have π
d
i
³
qP
´
= 0, hence
δM =
µ
γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
¶2
, (29)
which is the same expression as δ (regime 2), an illustration of Proposition 5. ¥
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